Hedging in the IR literature generally describes an actor who actively decides to not take sides, especially vis-a-vis great power competition. It is an “insurance-seeking behavior under situations of high uncertainty and high stakes” (Kuik, 2021). It is distinct from being neutral, which means being impartial and abstaining from participation, particularly in cases of armed conflict. Hedging is particularly defined by active endeavors to engage all sides while mitigating risks, without necessarily playing into one side. In this sense, hedging can be understood as some sort of middle ground between balancing and bandwagoning.
Indonesia has been described as somewhat of a “light hedger” compared to other Southeast Asian states. Indonesia’s stance originates from its historical experiences of being subjected to great power competition and colonialism. This inspired its independent and active foreign policy doctrine and practice of non-alignment. Yet there have been times when Indonesia leaned towards alignment, such as with the US during the Cold War. Currently, Indonesia hedges between the US and China, engaging with both while also actively maintaining its non-aligned stance. Indonesia may entertain China’s economic proposals, such as the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail, but this is offset by other economic deals with other players, such as Japan.
But, under Prabowo’s leadership, there are concerns that Indonesia may be abandoning hedging altogether. I believe Indonesian political leaders are showing early indications of abandoning hedging and leaning towards bandwagoning, which can be explained by the increasingly personalized way foreign policy is conducted.
Continue reading “Is Indonesia no longer hedging?”
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